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Abstract: This paper attempts to analyze how Romania has made its own choices 
about its future in Europe at the end of the Cold War, in the period between the fall 
of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Throughout the paper it can be observed that the first two years of post-communist 
Romania’s political evolution were marked by a false start in relation with the 
West. On the one hand, the domestic events in Romania maintained a negative 
perception of the West, and the government in Bucharest was not able to change 
this image. Furthermore, the imprecision and reluctance of Romania’s foreign 
policy gestures deepened this negative perception. Unlike other states in the region 
that have sent specific signals about the willingness to embrace rapidly the values 
of democracy and market economy, and to get closer to the Euro-Atlantic 
community, Romania’s gestures have created confusion, causing its late 
integration into the new European security system. 
Keywords: Romanian foreign policy, U.S. foreign policy, European security, Post-
Cold War era. 
The year 1989 marked the most dramatic transformation in the history of 
postwar Europe. In just a few months, the communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
collapsed like a row of dominoes, marking a symbolic end of the political and 
ideological division of the European continent. Thereby, the Cold War ended in 
exactly the same geopolitical area in which the United States and the Soviet Union 
began to dispute the supremacy of their own value system. Moreover, the future of 
the international system was covered in uncertainty. The Soviet withdrawal from 
its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe let a security vacuum that had to be 
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covered by formulating new European security arrangements, in order to maintain 
stability and to reduce the threats and risks that could affect international security
1
.  
Setting the new transatlantic framework after 1989 
Following the fall of the Berlin wall, the main goal of US foreign policy 
was to remain engaged in Europe and to lead the new transatlantic security 
architecture focused on the North Atlantic Alliance. America has rapidly chosen to 
lead the new international system and to avoid a premature withdrawal from 
Europe. Immediately after the Malta summit in December 1989, George Bush 
announced his vision regarding the future of the Euro-Atlantic security 
architecture: “I pledge today that the United States will maintain significant 
military forces in Europe as long as our allies desire our presence as part of a 
common security effort. As I said at NATO earlier this year, the United States will 
remain a European power. That means the United States will stay engaged in the 
future of Europe and in our common defence”
2
. The vision proposed by the Bush 
administration, known as the New Atlanticism, tried to reconcile the European aim 
to foster the integration process and the American goal to lead a transatlantic 
security framework. 
The American presence in Europe was seen as a stability factor. In June 
1990, during the Washington summit, Bush asserted: “We hope a continued US 
presence there will be seen as something that’s stabilizing. And NATO is the 
existing machinery that we feel, with an expanded mission, can best provide that 
stability”
3
. President’s Bush main goal was to assure the preeminence of the 
Alliance in Europe and to prevent other European independent structures to 
emerge as a competitor for NATO. 
The US determination to persist engaged in Europe collided with Europe’s 
own ambitions to build a security framework. This dissension had an important 
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impact upon the debates regarding the process of redefining the Euro-Atlantic 
security in the next period. France established a goal to foster the European 
integration and acted in the first phase according to the De Gaulle doctrine, which 
advocated for a lower American influence in Europe
4
. Therefore, France often 
collided with the U.S. objective to lead the European security system after the Cold 
War. 
France desired a broader and strengthened role for the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and, at the same time, the development of a 
European security and defence identity. These were to be achieved by proposing 
the absorption of the Western European Union in the process of European 
construction, in order to function as the armed pillar of the European Union. 
Moreover, François Mitterrand proposed, as a personal project, to establish a 
European confederation with the aim to gather all the states of the continent in a 
joint and permanent organization
5
. Among other tasks, this confederation was 
supposed to fill up the security vacuum left over by the Soviet disengagement in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Mitterand’s project encountered a lot of skepticism 
and, consequently, the American alternative was preferred. 
After the end of the Cold War, the US goal was to maintain NATO’s 
dominance in the European security architecture in order to link the two sides of 
the Atlantic. However, until 1989, NATO was thought as a mechanism against the 
Soviet Union. Once the enemy was gone, however, the continued relevance of 
NATO was brought into question and the new framework implied rethinking 
NATO’s role. While the collective defence guarantees provided by article 5 still 
remained the fundamental pillar, it was necessary to reinforce the political element 
and to redefine the strategic concept of the Alliance, based on a new concept of 
security
6
. 
During the process of developing a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture 
in the post-Cold War era, the essential role was played by the North-Atlantic 
Alliance. The Alliance had to manage the new challenges determined by the 
Europeans’ desire to build their own Security and Defence Identity and by the 
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security vacuum left behind by the withdrawal of the Soviets from the continent. 
Thus, NATO had to redefine its role and to adapt to the new international context 
after the end of the Cold War
7
. 
At the Rome summit, between 7 and 8 November 1991, the Alliance 
adopted a new strategic concept, based on a broader security approach. The new 
concept included the ethnic rivalries and the territorial conflicts from Central and 
Eastern Europe among the threats to the NATO Member States
8
. Despite the 
security guarantees provided by article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the new 
strategic concept highlighted the new challenges towards the international security 
which outstripped the framework of collective defence. In addition, the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council was established as a dialogue and cooperation 
mechanism with the former communist states that did not, in fact, receive the 
security guarantees provided by article 5. However, this was the first phase in a 
longer process which goal was to bring the states from Central and Eastern Europe 
closer to the political and security structures of the Alliance. At the time, an 
enlargement of NATO was difficult to imagine and could have cancelled all the 
efforts undertaken to assure the stability on the European continent, as the Soviet 
Union had not withdrawn officially from the area
9
. Neither the Alliance, nor the 
states from Eastern Europe were prepared to accomplish this phase. 
The differences between the American and European visions in terms of 
relating to the new security architecture in Europe are harmonized by adopting the 
formula of “interlocking institutions.” According to this formula: “NATO, CSCE, 
the European community, the Western European Union and the Council of Europe 
have to complete each other”
10
. Thus, the European ambition to promote its own 
strategic vision of the post-Cold War era had limited results
11
. The U.S. decision to 
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stay engaged in Europe centered the Euro-Atlantic security architecture on the 
North Atlantic Alliance under the leadership of America. 
After the bold changes faced by Eastern Europe during 1989, the American 
leadership in Europe was envisaged by Washington as a factor of stability; both for 
the future of Europe and for the international system. In the end, the European 
security system was transformed according to the terms agreed by the officials in 
Washington. As the American scholar Mary Elise Sarotte asserted, America had 
chosen to offer Europe a prefabricated multilateralism
12
. This multilateralism was 
anything else but a system that would assure U.S. preeminence in Europe. 
“Diplomacy of the absurd”: Romania’s relationship with the West after the 
fall of the Communist regime 
After the fall of communism, the future of the new East-European regimes 
was uncertain. How far would advance the processes of democratization and 
reform in this countries newly freed from communism? There were no guarantees 
that the states from Central and Eastern Europe will embrace rapidly the values of 
democracy and market economy. Also, there was a risk of recurrence of ethnic 
violence and border conflicts, kept in the background during the Cold War
13
. 
Hence, the Eastern democracies had to be integrated in a new European concert in 
order to maintain stability in the region and to prevent them to become a risk factor 
for the Euro-Atlantic security. In great measure, the political stability of the 
European continent depended on how the future of European security would be 
managed and the role assigned to Eastern Europe in this new security system
14
. 
Although their integration in the European system was necessary to maintain its 
stability, the states in the region had to prove their willingness to embrace the 
Western values and to move closer to the Euro-Atlantic community. 
At the same time, Romania had to manage an extremely difficult context 
because it had known the toughest and isolated communist regime, with the most 
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precarious economic and social situation. Unlike other ex-communist countries, 
several factors have contributed for the new government in Bucharest to start with 
delay in its effort to improve its international image. A particular opposition to 
embrace the path to reform or the subsequent political and ethnic tensions, such as 
the ethnic conflict in Targu-Mures or the brutal repression of young students 
peacefully protesting in the University square, had kept the West’s negative 
perception on Romania
15
. 
After five months since the fall of the Berlin wall, the American 
intelligence community made its first analysis on the future of Eastern Europe. 
There was a first delimitation of the states in the region in two groups, one 
including Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the other including Romania, 
Bulgaria and Albania. Moreover, in a worst-case scenario regarding the political 
evolutions in Eastern Europe, Romania was nominated along with Yugoslavia as 
the states with the greatest possibility to turn to “authoritarianism, growing 
repression of ethnic minorities, civil strife, and even the onset of greater interstate 
frictions”
16
. One can ascertain today that the Yugoslav scenario became reality. 
Romania stayed away from this evolution. However, the perception of its 
international partners at the beginning of the 1990s depended on the choices made 
at home. 
Furthermore, in the case of Romania, the perception that the political power 
had been assumed by members of the ex-communist regime, combined with the 
decision of the National Salvation Front to become a political party, made 
impossible the existence of a national consensus regarding the future of Romania
17
. 
The new opposition parties did not benefit from the structures of power inherited 
from the former regime thus it was very difficult to gather support from a 
politically immature society. Nevertheless, the opposition was barely taken into 
account by the new government in the process of redefining the national interest of 
Romania. These factors have contributed to the perception that the new political 
                                                
15
 M. Dobre, op.cit., pp. 239-240. For the evolution of the events, see Steven D. Roper, Romania: 
The Unfinished Revolution, Amsterdam, Harwood Academic, 2000, pp. 110-112. 
16
 “National Intelligence Estimate 12-90, The Future of Eastern Europe (key judgements only)”, 
April 1990, in Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton (eds.), Masterpieces of History: The 
Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989, Budapest, Central European University Press, 
2010, p. 690. 
17
 For an analysis regarding the political evolution of post-communist Romania, see Tom Gallagher, 
“A feeble embrace: Romania’s engagement with democracy, 1989-94”, Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 12, no. 2, 1996, pp. 145-172. 
E	<=	

95 

power hesitated in moving toward political liberalization, which determined the 
skepticism of the West regarding the evolution of Romania.  
The events of June 1990 have deepened even more Western Europe’s 
negative perception on Romania. The American ambassador in Bucharest was 
recalled to Washington for consultations, an extremely severe gesture in 
diplomatic relations. According to an American official: “No other event affected 
more the American point of view than the arrival of the miners in Bucharest, an 
event with very negative impact. It seemed that the regime in Romania is using a 
part of society to repress the dissidence”
18
. Furthermore, even if the bilateral 
relationship improved, especially due to Romania’s attitude towards the Persian 
Gulf crisis in the UN Security Council, Romania’s domestic situation did not 
change, and, in September 1992, the prime minister Petre Roman had resigned, 
following a new arrival of the miners in Bucharest.  
One can observe that Romania had a false start in the relationship with its 
Euro-Atlantic partners, and the officials in Bucharest did not have the capacity of 
understanding the nature of domestic changes that the West was willing to perceive 
in Romania. Thus, the efforts to change Romania’s image, an indispensable 
element which influenced the development of its foreign policy in the next period, 
did not find a strong response from the Western governments. This discrepancy 
between the messages of Washington and Bucharest was labeled “diplomacy of the 
absurd” by Robert Hutchings, director of European Affairs at the National Security 
Council in 1989-1992
19
. 
Adrian Nastase, Foreign Minister between June 1990 and October 1992, 
claims that one of the issues of dissatisfaction in the relationship with the West was 
the attempt to isolate Romania through its exclusion from the efforts to create 
regional organizations
20
. Thereby, Romania was getting a discriminatory 
treatment, and the Americans did not support Romania openly, the relationship 
                                                
18
 Observation used by Lawrence Eagleburger, deputy Secretary of State, in a conversation with 
Adrian Nastase on November 30, 1990. See Adrian Nastase, România dup Malta. 875 de zile la 
Externe, vol. 2 (Novemeber 1 – December 31, 1990), Bucharest, Titulescu European Foundation, 
2006, pp. 224-225. 
19
 See Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. 245-253. 
20
 Adrian Nastase, Romanian-American partnership: my contribution, Bucharest, Monitorul Oficial, 
2013, p. 89.  
AE	<=	

96 
being characterized by “frustration and different interests”
 21
. The Romanian 
government wanted fair treatment, considering that it made decisive steps towards 
democracy and market economy
22
. Also, the government considered that it had the 
support of the majority of the citizens in the commitment to implement radical 
reforms
23
. Analyzing these assertions, one can observe that the two parts did not 
speak the same language in the bilateral relations, since the Americans did not 
perceive the same degree of change in Romania.  
Therefore, according to Nastase, America targeted the differentiation 
between states from Central and Eastern Europe. The Romanian official considers 
that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Americans pursued to encourage the 
democratic processes in the region, acknowledging, at the same time, the security 
interests of the Soviet Union. Afterwards, when the Soviet withdrawal becamed 
more obvious, the American administration pursued to create a pro-American bloc 
of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, because these states offered much more 
advantages and could be influenced through economic support or through the 
promise for help in getting the Soviet troops out of their territories. Instead, 
Romania was left in a grey-zone, a buffer between the West and USSR. Because 
they could not determine the alignment of Romania’s policy, the Americans 
conceived in this case the “democratic differentiation” thesis and they exerted 
domestic pressions with the help of the political opposition
24
.  
Also, Romania’s former president, Ion Iliescu, argues that in the 
relationship between the US and the Soviet Union “intervened in 1990 a sort of 
tacit agreement that pulled out from the zone of Soviet interest only Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia”
 25
. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze if America had a strategy in the 
vein described by Nstase and Iliescu. But, at the same time, one can observe that 
the domestic evolution of Romania did not respect the genuine Western democratic 
standards, although the Romanian officials claimed the contrary. Even if the 
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officials from Bucharest stressed the positive aspects in Romania’s political 
evolution, the efforts were not enough because the domestic evolution did not pass 
unobserved in the West, especially in Washington
26
.  
According to Robert Hutchings, the American government was considering 
any forward moving in its bilateral relations with Romania on the condition to 
perceive “demonstrable progress” in Bucharest on four main areas of concerns: 
free and fair elections, democratic control over the Securitate, independent media, 
and equal treatment of minorities
27
. Although the situation in Romania was 
improving and Washington was exercising pressure to see tangible results, the 
progress was still very slow. 
Romania and the new Euro-Atlantic security system 
The majority of the Eastern states were preoccupied to redefine their 
position within the new Euro-Atlantic security system in order to find solutions to 
their security concerns
28
. In the first years after 1989, there was an outbreak of 
regional organizations initiatives. The most successful initiative was the Visegrad 
group, formed by Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. The Visegrad Group was 
not an international organization, but a mechanism of dialogue and cooperation to 
support the common effort of the member states to get closer to the Euro-Atlantic 
community. It represented a political message and, at the same time, it illustrated 
the availability to cooperate with the European structures
29
. Their political will was 
immediately transformed into concrete measures and they made important steps 
towards NATO after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. 
In its effort to avoid becoming a buffer zone between East and West, 
Romania also attempted to propose initiatives of regional organizations. The most 
important was the Union of Central Europe, proposed in 1991. This organization 
was envisaged as a security structure of the European states, members of the 
Warsaw Pact, within the wider framework of CSCE, and in which could take part 
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as observers the United States, the European Community, and USSR. This 
initiative was welcomed with reserves because a Central-European security 
organization could hamper the perspectives of getting closer to NATO and could 
also antagonize Russia
30
. Therefore, the initiative did not gather the support of 
other states. These concerns did not lack justification, especially if we bear in mind 
the U.S. objectives in Europe after 1989. Thus, Washington did not perceive in a 
positive manner a gesture that would tried to create a new security organization 
Europe. 
On the other hand, the first two years of Romania’s foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era were more hesitating that in the above-mentioned case. I 
already asserted the West’s negative perception on Romania and the Romanian 
officials’ failure to change it, especially due to developments in domestic politics. 
At the same time, Romania has chosen to implement a moderate foreign policy 
towards the dramatic transformations that were taking place in Europe. The 
Visegrad Group acted in a more decisive manner, drawing more clearly its option 
for Europe and NATO
31
. Instead, Romania preferred to play both ends, 
formulating imprecise foreign policy gestures. By the time Romania asserted 
firmly its Western option, it was already too late to become member of the Euro-
Atlantic family, simultaneously with the Visegrad Group. 
Romania’s hesitation could easily be observed in its foreign policy 
gestures. The assertion of the new government established after the Romanian 
revolution to respect its commitments within the Warsaw Pact, although this 
alliance was generated by the former communist regime, or the support for CSCE 
as the fundamental pillar of the new European security system are illustrative for 
the strategy adopted by the new political power in Bucharest
32
. Romania’s support 
for larger security arrangements, such as those promoted by the French president 
Mitterand, collided with the American objectives to maintain its preeminence in 
Europe through a redefined NATO.  
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The same middle way path was applied in its relationship the Soviet 
Union
33
. Romania was the only state that accepted the Soviet proposal to conclude 
bilateral treaties with former communist countries in the context of Warsaw Pact’s 
dissolution. Moreover, the article fourth of treaty mentioned that the parties will 
not participate in any alliances directed against any one of them
34
. Iliescu pointed 
out that the purpose of this treaty was to replace the old treaty based on the old 
realities between USSR and Romania. Also, he stressed that the article four did not 
obstruct Romania’s evolution towards NATO because, at the time, the Atlantic 
Alliance and the Soviet Union did not consider themselves adversaries
35
. 
Although Iliescu’s assertion is real to some extent, unequivocally this 
article was able to limit Romania’s discretion in foreign policy. Facing a strong 
opposition, the treaty was never ratified by the Romanian Parliament. But, at the 
same time, the failure of the Romanian diplomacy to forsee the dissolution of the 
Soviet state and given that Romania wanted, at least theoretically, to make precise 
steps towards the Euro-Atlantic community, it represented a negative foreign 
policy gesture for the West. It proved once again the imprecision and hesitation in 
Romania’s foreign policy. 
Conclusions 
To conclude with, it is clear that the first two years of post-communist 
Romania’s political evolution were marked by a false start in relation with the 
West. On the one hand, the domestic events in Romania maintained a negative 
perception of the West, and the government in Bucharest was not able to change 
this image. It was a real discrepancy between the mesagges of the two parts. The 
officials from Bucharest did not understand the nature of the domestic changes that 
the West wanted to see in Romania. Thus, the policy of the West in its relation to 
Bucharest was perceived as discriminatory in comparison to other states. 
Furthermore, the imprecision and reluctance of Romania’s foreign policy 
gestures deepened this negative perception. Unlike other states in the region that 
have sent specific signals about the willingness to embrace rapidly the values of 
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democracy and market economy, and to get closer to the Euro-Atlantic 
community, Romania’s gestures created confusion, causing its late integration into 
the new European security system. 
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